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What	the	Anthropocene	Means	for	EPT		 Manuel	Arias-Maldonado	University	of	Málaga,	Spain	marias@uma.es		2018	WPSA	Conference,	San	Francisco	Panel:	Science	and	Environmental	Political	Theory		_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________		How	should	environmental	political	theorists	deal	with	environmental	science?	The	question	has	acquired	a	new	urgency	with	the	rise	of	the	Anthropocene,	a	geological-cum-ecological	concept	received	with	skepticism	by	 many	 political	 theorists.	 In	 part,	 this	 is	 due	 to	 the	 notion	 that	 there	 is	 an	 “oficial”	 version	 of	 the	Anthropocene	that	comes	out	already	linked	to	a	set	of	normative	and	policy	prescriptions	for	dealing	with	climate	change	and	the	other	manifestations	of	the	new	epoch,	i.e.	a	managerial	approach	that	is	capitalist-friendly	 and	 technologically	 trigger-happy.	 However,	 this	 in	 turn	 reflects	 deep-seated	 suspicions	 about	scientific	 findings	 and	 the	way	 in	which	 they	 are	 “produced”.	 This	 paper	will	 reflect	 on	 this	 topic	 in	 the	framework	provided	by	the	Anthropocene,	arguing	that	a	clear	demarcation	is	needed	between	the	scientific	and	the	sociopolitical	 inquiry,	whereupon	the	former	provides	the	latter	with	findings	to	be	discussed	and	processed	 in	 a	 sociopolitical	 fashion	 -whereas	 scientists	 should	 refrain	 from	making	 normative	 or	 policy	prescriptions	or,	if	any,	should	make	them	explicitly.	After	all,	environmental	political	theory	would	not	exist	without	environmental	sciences.	The	debate	on	the	beginning	of	the	Anthropocene	will	help	to	make	this	point.	_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________															
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1.	Introduction.		Both	 environmental	 political	 theory	 and	 environmentalism	 at	 large	 have	 always	maintained	 an	uneasy	relationship	with	science.	The	sudden	irruption	of	the	Anthropocene	hypothesis	and	its	rapid	spread	in	the	human	and	social	sciences	has	not	helped	to	allay	this	tension	-on	the	contrary,	the	latter	 is	 resurfacing	 in	 novel	 ways.	 This	 paper	 is	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 reasons	 behind	 such	uneasiness,	as	well	as	an	attempt	to	leave	it	behind	as	far	as	the	Anthropocene	is	concerned.	It	thus	incorporates	a	modest	proposal	for	pacifying	the	relationship	between	science	and	environmental	political	theory.		Historically,	 the	 reasons	 for	 EPT's	 reservations	 about	 scientific	 practice	 are	 not	 hard	 to	 grasp.	Science,	as	a	key	part	of	the	modern	project,	had	not	just	described	the	world	but	had	contributed	to	its	subjugation:	knowledge	is	power,	as	Bacon	famously	stated,	and	in	the	hands	of	modern	human	beings	this	power	has	been	also	the	power	to	subordinate	and	destroy	the	nonhuman	world.	For	all	the	 supposed	 neutrality	 of	 the	 scientific	 method,	 the	 scientific	 worldview	 and	 its	 alliance	 with	technology	has	been	presented	as	being	a	main	drive	behind	the	ecological	crisis.	The	sociology	of	science	would	have	confirmed	this	suspicion	by	showing	how	social	values	and	norms	unavoidably	slip	into	the	laboratory	and	condition	the	way	in	which	science	is	made:	from	the	questions	that	are	asked	to	the	solutions	that	are	found.	Moreover,	as	we	shall	see,	scientific	detachment	would	have	encouraged	 social	 detachment:	 in	 describing	 the	 nonhuman	 world	 as	 lacking	 in	 feelings	 or	subjectivity,	 science	 is	 charged	 with	 having	 normalized	 mistreatment	 and	 exploitation,	 thus	contributing	decisively	to	both	environmental	unsustainability	and	moral	corruption.		The	paradox	here,	of	course,	is	that	environmentalism	has	always	depended	on	science	to	make	its	own	case.	On	the	one	hand,	unsustainability	itself	could	not	be	measured	and	signalled	without	the	help	of	science.	And	the	same	goes	for	phenomena	such	as	climate	change.	On	the	other,	statements	about	 the	 moral	 standing	 of	 animals	 would	 be	 harder	 to	 make	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 scientific	descriptions	of	their	sentience	and	inner	life.	After	all,	the	whole	conversation	about	the	place	of	humanity	in	the	wider	natural	world	would	have	never	started	without	the	Darwinian	revolution.	There	is	certainly	another	side	to	environmentalism,	namely	a	romantic	one	that	does	not	need	any	scientific	insight	to	vindicate	a	good	life	embedded	in	nature	or	to	make	a	moral	case	in	favour	of	natural	 conservation.	Yet,	 for	 all	 the	 relevance	 that	 can	be	 granted	 to	purely	moral	 or	 aesthetic	arguments,	they	hardly	suffice	for	advancing	political	arguments	on	behalf	of	sustainability	and/or	conservation	in	the	public	sphere	of	complex,	capitalist	societies	where	economic	growth	is	still	a	priority	for	most	governments	and	populations.		This	somewhat	schizophrenic	relationship	with	science	has	become	apparent	again	since	the	advent	of	 the	Anthropocene	hypothesis.	For	 instance,	Malm	and	Hornborg	(2014)	have	warned	that	 the	Anthropocene	discussion	cannot	be	led	by	natural	scientists,	since	they	tend	to	overlook	questions	of	 power	 and	 politics	 -hence	 creating	 the	 sensation	 that	 the	 current	 planetary	 predicament	 is	"natural".	 Revkin	 (2014)	 has	 also	 expressed	 concer	 for	 the	 potential	 marginalization	 of	 social	sciences	in	this	debate.	At	the	same	time,	though,	the	debate	begins	only	after	natural	scientists	have	formulated	an	hypothesis	-one	that	can	be	grounded	either	on	geology	or	Earth	System	Science,	or	perhaps	both.	Scientific	observation	precedes	philosophical	discussion,	it	could	be	argued.	Now,	this	may	be	seen	as	an	instance	of	epistemological	naivety,	since	there	is	no	such	thing	as	an	unmediated	observation	of	reality.	And	the	same	goes	for	"brute"	facts	whose	existence	is	denied.	That	is	why	a	careful	demarcation	of	natural	and	social	science's	corresponding	jurisdictions	seems	to	be	the	best	way	out	of	this	conundrum.	An	old-fashioned	proposition,	perhaps,	yet	a	reasonable	one.		This	 paper	will	 be	 structured	 as	 follows.	 For	 a	 start,	 the	 troubles	with	 science	 -in	 this	 case	 the	Anthropocene	science-	will	be	examined.	This	entails	dealing	with	two	different	arguments:	on	the	one	 hand,	 the	 claim	 that	 scientific	 representations	 are	 in	 themselves	 a	way	 of	 transforming	 the	
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emphasis	on	the	geological	and	the	systemic	seems	to	be	an	invitation	to	planetary	management,	while	occluding	the	actual	destruction	of	ecosystems	and	natural	habitats.	On	the	other,	the	relation	between	 description	 and	 prescription	 becomes	 troublesome	 when	 scientists	 themselves	 make	normative	claims	about	how	to	deal	with	the	Anthropocene.	In	this	case,	suspicions	arise	because	of	the	 association	 between	 scientific	 statements	 and	 the	 ecomodernist	 approach	 to	 the	 good	Anthropocene.	Finally,	an	attempt	to	clarify	this	ambiguous	entanglement	will	be	presented,	with	the	 aim	to	pacify	 the	 relationship	between	science	 and	environmental	 political	 theory.	 It	will	 be	argued	that	such	goal	can	only	be	reached	if	the	competence	of	science	to	state	facts	is	respected	-facts	that	do	not	speak	normatively	by	themselves	but	must	constitute	the	basic	premise	of	a	debate	about	their	social	and	political	implications.	This	suggests	that	both	scientists	and	political	theorists	must	come	to	terms	with	their	respective	functions.		
2.	The	trouble	with	(Anthropocene)	science.		A	 first	 concern	 with	 the	 Anthropocene	 science	 reflects	 a	 longstanding	 suspicion	 about	 the	"objective"	quality	of	the	scientific	endeavour.	Does	scientists	only	"make"	science?	Or,	by	doing	so,	they	 do	 something	 else?	 If	 the	 latter,	 what	 do	 natural	 scientists	 do	 when	 they	 describe	 a	 new	geological	age	or	suggest	 that	the	Earth	is	a	complex,	unified	system	whose	dynamics	have	been	altered	by	sustained	human	action?	Can	we	just	take	these	scientific	statements	at	face	value?		The	main	reason	for	this	reservation	lies	in	the	absence	of	a	match	between	language	and	reality.	Ultimately,	the	concepts	that	we	employ	to	explore	reality	condition	the	way	in	which	we	perceive	it.	Moreover,	it	is	debatable	whether	we	can	access	an	objective	nature	that	is	"out	there"	awaiting	for	our	observations.	As	Noel	Castree	has	suggested,			"It's	important	not	to	confuse	knowledges	of	nature	with	the	'natural'	things	those	knowledges	are	about.	(...)	There	is,	in	short,	no	unmediated	access	to	the	natural	world	free	from	frameworks	of	understanding.	These	frameworks	organise	the	way	that	individuals	and	groups	view	nature	and	delimit	where	the	natural	ends	and	the	unnatural,	non-natural	or	artificial	begins"	(Castree	2005,	16;	his	emphasis).		Furthermore,	 such	 frameworks	 are	 far	 from	 value-neutral:	 they	 organise	 our	 understanding	 in	
certain	ways	that	in	turn	deeply	influence	how	we	deal	materially	with	the	world,	i.e.	transforming	,	manipulating,	 and	 destroying	 it.	 Arne	 Vetlesen	 has	made	 a	 fine	work	 of	 renewing	 this	 critique,	arguing	that	we		“could	not	have	engaged	in	the	activities	that	now	threaten	to	spell	the	end	of	nature	(nature	as	we	used	to	know	it)	were	it	not	the	fact	that	for	at	least	four	centuries	we	have	regarded	and	treated	(nonhuman)	nature	as	dead”	(Vetlesen	2015,	129).		To	him,	this	is	related	to	an	enhancement	of	quantity	over	quality	that	is	characteristic	of	modern	science	since	Descartes,	 involving	the	denial	of	any	 inner	 life	or	even	 telos	 to	nature.	Such	 is	 the	cultural	precondition	of	human	domination	of	nature,	in	which	technology	plays	a	crucial	role	as	an	instrument	for	"damaging	and	wiping	out	entire	regions	of	what	used	to	be	wilderness"	(Vetlesen	2015,	150).	I	do	not	wish	to	discuss	this	argument	in	detail	here,	although	I	find	it	odd	that	human	domination	of	nature	via	science	and	technology	is	described	as	a	modern	endeavor	and		not	as	a	transhistoric	process	associated	to	the	aggressive	adaptation	to	the	environment	that	defines	the	human	 species	 way	 of	 being	 (see	 Arias-Maldonado	 2015).	 What	 interests	 me	 here	 is	 the	dennounciation	of	a	direct	link	between	scientific	observation	and	human	domination.		If	we	 turn	 to	 the	Anthropocene,	 the	point	has	been	made	 that	 scientific	 descriptions	of	 the	new	geological	 age	 and/or	 of	 the	 Earth	 as	 an	 integrated	 system	 may	 contribute	 to	 "planetary	governmentality"	(Uhrqvist	and	Lövbrand	2014,	342).	Michel	Foucault	is	invoked	here	to	suggest	that	scientific	descriptions	direct	 the	way	in	which	we	act	upon	socionatural	reality,	without	any	need	to	attach	explicit	normative	statements	to	such	supposedly	"objective"	descriptions.	Systems	
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thinking	 would	 thus	 be	 a	 way	 of	 framing	 reality	 that	 invites	 "earth	 system	 management"	 and	consequently	the	ruling	of	experts.	A	similar	point	has	been	made	by	Stacey	Alaimo	in	connection	with	the	way	in	which	the	Anthropocene	is	visually	represented,	satellite-wise,	from	above:		"The	already	iconic	images	of	the	Anthropocene	ask	nothing	from	the	human	spectator;	they	make	no	claim;	they	 neither	 involve	 nor	 implore.	 The	 images	 make	 risk,	 harm,	 and	 suffering	 undetectable,	 as	 toxic	 and	radioactive	regions	do	not	appear,	nor	do	the	movements	of	climate	refugees.	The	geographies	of	the	sixth	extinction	are	not	evident	"	(Alaimo	2017,	92).		Likewise,	 the	value-laden	character	of	scientific	 framings	would	also	be	evident	 in	 the	geological	emphasis,	 a	 focus	 that	 to	 her	 eyes	 may	 blur	 the	 chemical	 or	 biological	 dimensions	 of	 human	colonization	of	the	planet	"by	focusing	on	an	externalized	and	inhuman	sense	of	materiality"	(Alaimo	2017,	94).	That	is	also	why	environmental	historian	Jason	Moore	(2015)	wishes	to	"socialize	the	ecological"	and	rejects	the	use	of	categories	such	as	that	of	"the	human	enterprise"	that	is	prominent	in	Earth	System	Science	literature.	Scientific	framings,	in	sum,	are	reality-forming.		A	related	critique	concerns	the	distinction	between	description	and	prescription.	As	we	have	just	seen,	 this	 separation	 is	 already	 compromised	 by	 the	 value-laden	 assumptions	 that	 underpin	scientific	categories	and	observations.	Jeremy	Baskin	(2015)	argues	that	the	Anthropocene	is	"an	ideology	dressed	as	paradigm",	i.e.	a	way	of	understanding	the	world	and	a	normative	guide	to	action	rather	than	a	simple	set	of	scientific	insights.	To	him,	a	perfect	proof	of	this	can	be	found	in	the	debate	around	the	"golden	spike"	of	the	Anthropocene,	i.e.	the	search	for	a	stratigraphical	marker	that	is	also	meant	to	establish	the	moment	when	the	new	geological	age	began.	The	fact	that	so	different	moments	are	discussed	suggests,	according	to	Baskin,	that	geological	(thus	"scientific")	time	is	less	relevant	than	political,	cultural	or	historical	time.	Depending	on	whether	the	beginning	of	intensive	agriculture,	 the	Columbian	exchange,	 the	 Industrial	Revolution	or	the	nuclear	explosions	 in	mid-twentieth	century	is	chosen,	the	message	so	conveyed	about	the	causes	of	the	Anthropocene	differ	widely.	More	on	this	later.		On	 the	other	hand,	Baskin	and	others	have	 lamented	 that	 some	natural	 scientists	have	 shown	a	propensity	to	accompany	their	descriptions	with	explicit	prescriptive	claims	about	the	way	in	which	human	 societies	 should	 answer	 the	 challenge	 posed	 by	 the	 Anthropocene.	 Such	 claims	 would	roughly	 belong	 to	 the	 ecomodernist	 dispensation,	 that	 is,	 they	 unsurprisingly	 reveal	 a	 notable	confidence	 in	 the	possibility	of	designing	scientifically-informed	collective	solutions	 to	planetary	disruption.	Technology	is	seen	with	confidence	and	Earth-management	guided	by	experts	presented	as	the	most	suitable	tool	for	achieving	not	just	a	sustainable	but	also	a	good	Anthropocene	that	looks	like	an	improved,	nature-friendly	version	of	liberal-capitalist	society.	The	Breathrough	Institute	is	a	usual	suspect	in	this	regard,	while	Paul	Crutzen	(2002,	23)	is	quoted	suggesting	that	large-scale	geo-engineering	projects	may	be	necessary	in	order	to	optimize	climate	and	Ellis	and	Haff	(2009)	asking	from	Earth-science	 graduates	 a	more	determined	engagement	with	public-decision	making.	 The	danger	that	is	perceived	in	this	account	is	aptly	summarized	by	Baskin	himself:		"The	 emphasis	 on	 ‘the	 rule	 of	 experts’,	 and	 the	 associated	 endorsement	 of	 a	 technocratic	 consciousness,	depoliticises	society	and	tends	to	reduce	the	political	to	the	technical,	justifying	decisions	on	technical	grounds.	(Baskin	2015,	22).		The	worry	is	that	a	scientific	account	of	the	Anthropocene	might	lead	to	a	"scientist"	response	and	therefore	to	a	rigidly	delineated	socioecological	regime	which	manages	to	evade	the	hard	political	questions:	who	has	produced	the	Anthropocene,	who	suffer	the	consequences,	who	is	responsible.	Relatedly,	the	implicit	vindication	of	a	managerial	approach	may	breed	complacency	and	delude	us	into	thinking	that	no	extraordinary	measures	are	needed	even	though	the	Holocene	conditions	are	gone.	 As	 we	 have	 get	 used	 to	 talk	 abour	 environmental	 risks,	 we	 have	 lost	 our	 sensitivity	 to	catastrophes	and	become	"Apocalypse-blind"	(Manemann	2014,	p.	45).		
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Finally,	it	should	be	noted,	the	Anthropocene	science	is	also	questioned	by	a	number	of	scientists	that	 are	 not	 persuaded	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 evidence	 presented	 by	 its	 advocates.	 Geologists	Whitney	Autin	and	John	Holbrook	(2012)	have	asked,	for	instance,	whether	the	Anthropocene	is	an	issue	of	stratigraphy	or	just	"pop	culture".	His	skepticism	is	encapsulated	in	the	following	question:	"Does	 humanity	 operate	 on	 such	 a	 grand	 scale	 that	 we	 drive	 Earth	 processes	 in	 ways	 that	overshadow	tectonic,	climatic,	and	eustatic	processes?"	(Autin	and	Holbrook	2012,	61).	They,	for	one,	remain	unconvinced.	And	the	same	goes	for	fellow	geologists	Stanley	Finney	and	Lucy	Edwards	(2016),	who,	 as	 chair	 of	 the	 International	 Commission	 on	 Stratigraphy	 and	 commssioner	 of	 the	North	 American	 Commission	 on	 Stratigraphic	 Nomenclature,	 respectively,	 dislike	 the	 idea	 of	 a	geological	epoch	that,	 if	 it	were	to	begin	around	1945,	would	have	a	duration	of	one	average	life	span.	And,	although	they	await	the	Anthropocene	Working	Group	proposal	in	order	to	see	whether	there	 are	 stratigraphical	 grounds	 for	 recognizing	 the	 new	 epoch,	 they	 lament	 that	 the	 drive	 to	officially	 recognize	 the	 Anthropocene	 may	 be	 "political	 rather	 than	 scientific".	 In	 a	 deep	 time	perspective,	in	other	words,	the	Anthropocene	feels	too	contemporary	to	be	true.	In	James	Wescott's	words:		"The	challenge	is	to	convince	geologists	accustomed	to	digging	much	further	back	in	time	that	the	evidence	accumulating	now	will	be	significant,	 stratigraphically	 speaking,	deep	 into	 the	future.	Geologists	are	being	asked	to	become	prophets"	(Westcott	2015).		What	should	environmental	political	theory	make	out	of	all	this?		
3.	Paradoxes	of	interdisciplinarity.		From	the	vantage	point	of	the	present,	past	science	has	mostly	suffered	from	anthropocentrism	-up	to	Copernicus	 and	Darwin,	 human	beings	were	 taken	as	 the	measures	of	 all	 things.	This	 can	be	forgiven,	 as	 it	 was	 the	 human	 being	 himself	 who	 was	 observing	 the	 world.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	Anthropocene	 is	a	mixed	blessing:	 it	 speaks	of	a	planet	that	has	been	colonized	and	altered	by	a	sustained	and	massive	human	activity,	but	at	the	same	time	it	reminds	us	that	geological	forces	and	planetary	systems	do	not	care	much	about	human	exceptionalism.	It	helps,	in	other	words,	to	de-center	humankind.		Such	news	should	be	welcomed	on	the	part	of	environmental	political	theory,	since	the	latter	has	traditionally	 laboured	to	debunk	human	exceptionalism.	As	William	Connolly	has	 just	argued,	 to	challenge	 "sociocentrism"	 in	 this	 context	 means	 "coming	 to	 terms	 with	 bumpy	 processes	 of	planetary	self-organization	that	interact	with	each	other	and	with	human	cultures"	(Connolly	2017,	33).	Natural	sciences	are	not	enough	for	this	complex	task,	since	they	cannot	make	sense	of	human	impacts	on	the	nonhuman	world	or	can	do	it	too	partially	-that	is,	registering	the	impacts	without	understanding	their	causality.	His	recommendation:		"What	is	needed,	then,	is	investment	in	a	double	process	by	which	we	move	back	and	forth	between	findings	in	a	specific	science	and	attention	to	the	most	reflective	readings	of	human	cultural	experience.	(...)	The	idea	is	that	the	earth	and	cultural	sciences	need	each	other"	(Connolly	2017,	107).		In	other	words,	he	is	pointing	to	the	need	for	interdisciplinarity	in	the	study	of	the	Anthropocene	and,	 more	 generally,	 all	 things	 socioecological.	 Of	 course,	 he	 is	 right.	 But	 this	 epistemological	promiscuity	must	be	handled	with	caution.	As	we	will	stress	later,	cultural	inflections	have	no	role	to	play	whatsoever	as	far	as	pure	descriptions	are	concerned	-no	matter	how	outdated	that	wording,	"pure	descriptions",		may	sound.	For	instance,	Connolly	himself	comments	on	the	relevance	of	still	recent	 discoveries	 such	 as	 the	 workings	 of	 plate	 tectonics	 and	 the	 ocean	 conveyor	 belt	 for	 an	understanding	of	the	planetary	system	and	the	relative	helplessness	of	human	beings	within	it.	That	is	pure	science:	the	observation,	measurement,	description	and	explanation	of	natural	phenomena	in	 which	 human	 influence	 can	 be	 discerned	 (anthropogenic	 climate	 change	 can	 affect	 ocean	circulation)	or	not	(plate	tectonics	seem	to	be	out	of	human	reach).	Yet	let	us	see	what	geologist	Jan	
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Zalasiewicz	and	his	colleagues	responded	to	the	charge	that	the	Anthropocene	may	well	just	be	"pop	culture":		"The	concept	has	certainly	gone	beyond	the	confines	of	stratigraphic	research.	But	much	of	the	interest	has	been	among	the	wider	scientific	community,	because	Anthropocene	explicitly	compares	human	perturbation	of	the	Earth	system	(as	observed)	with	ancient	natural	perturbations	(as	preserved	via	proxy	evidence	in	rock	strata),	and	it	considers	together	and	integrates	diverse	forms	of	environmental	change"	(Zalasiewicz	et	al.	2014,	62).		What	 shows	 here	 is	 that	 scientists	 cannot	 prevent	 their	 formulations	 to	 be	 appropriated	 and	discussed	elsewhere.	This	includes	misinterpretations,	sometimes	among	scientists	themselves,	as	well	as	paradigmatic	conflicts.	Without	excluding	the	geological	meaning	of	the	Anthropocene,	social	scientist	Clive	Hamilton	(2017)	has	insisted	that	the	Anthropocene	is	not	a	term	coined	to	describe	the	continued	spread	of	human	impacts	on	the	landscape	or	further	modification	of	the	ecosystems,	but	a	term	describing	a	rupture	in	the	functioning	of	the	Earth	System	as	a	whole.	This	means	that	the	young	discipline	of	Earth	System	Science,	rather	than	geology,	is	the	one	to	listen	to	as	far	as	the	Anthropocene	is	concerned.	Earth	system,	not	ecosystems,	is	the	scientific	object.	Political	theorists	dealing	with	socionatural	relations	should	take	notice.	The	problem	is	that	"much	of	the	analysis	from	 scientists	 begins	 from	 the	 same	 misconception"	 (Connolly	 2017,	 13).	 This	 confusion,	 if	Hamilton	is	right	in	dennouncing	it,	owes	much	to	the	radical	novelty	of	both	this	new	paradigm.		Yet	the	Anthropocene	Working	Group	that	is	lobbying	-so	to	speak-	for	the	official	recognition	of	the	new	epoch	has	also	stressed,	against	critics,	that	adding	the	Anthropocene	to	the	Geological	Time	Scale	 can	 only	 be	 done	 if	 conclusive	 stratigraphic	 evidence	 is	 collected.	 This	 entails	 that	 "it	 is	essential	to	disentangle	the	geological	evidence	from	other	ramifications,	 including	societal	ones"	(Zalasiewicz	2017	et	al.,	206).	What	the	Anthropocene	Working	Group	currently	assembles	is	thus	an	 stratigraphical	 case	 based	 on	 the	 accumulated	 sedimentary	 record.	 As	 it	 happens,	 such	observation	is	made	by	human	beings	who	have	also	devised	a	Geological	Time	Scale	in	the	first	place.	But	then	an	important	qualification	is	added:	
 
"It	so	happens	that	the	bulk	of	this	change	is	currently	human-driven,	but	if	exactly	the	same	changes	had	been	produced	not	by	human	action,	but	for	example	by	actions	of	some	other	species,	by	the	effect	of	extraordinary	volcanic	eruptions	or	bolide	strikes,	or	by	some	other	means,	then	the	geological	justification	would	remain	unchanged"	(Zalasiewicz	et	al.	2017,	220).		It	makes	 sense:	 a	major	 alteration,	whose	 stratigraphical	 traces	 are	 being	 seeked,	 is	 taken	 into	account	 -yet	 the	 identity	of	 the	 actor	 that	has	produced	 it	 remains,	 from	a	geological	 viewpoint,	relatively	unimportant.	That	is	also	why	the	usage	of	the	term	"Anthropocene"	in	the	social	sciences	and	the	humanities	-not	to	mention	public	discourse	and	literary	fiction-	has	nothing	to	do	with	its	stratigraphic	evaluation:	either	there	is	a	fossil	record	or	there	is	not.		At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 a	 clear-cut	 demarcation	 is	 not	 easy	when	 a	 concept	 deals	with	 the	aggregated	social	impact	on	the	planet.	As	a	consequence,	the	debate	about	the	golden	spike	of	the	Anthropocene	easily	trascends	disciplinary	barriers	and	becomes	part	of	a	wider	conversation	about	the	human	presence	on	Earth.	In	this	regard,	even	the	symbolic	and	political	appropriatedness	of	different	starting	points	have	been	discussed	(see	Davies	2016).	An	early	date	would	focus	on	the	
causes	(the	beginning	of	an	intense	human	intervention	on	the	planet)	whereas	a	late	one	would	emphasize	the	consequences	(or	the	effects	of	such	intervention),	whereas	choosing	industrialization	means	identifying	capitalism	as	the	major	driver	of	the	new	epoch.	But,	as	Zalasiewicz	notes,	this	is	not	how	science	is	supposed	to	work.	As	the	Anthropocene	is	"captured"	by	social	sciences	and	the	humanities,	 part	 of	 the	 conversation	 revolves	 around	 meanings	 and	 explanations	 rather	 than	measurements	 and	 causation.	Once	 the	Anthropocene	 is	 understood	as	 a	new	 framework	under	which	socionatural	relations	are	to	be	approached,	a	framework	that	establishes	as	its	premise	the	longstanding	 human	 colonization	 and	 alteration	 of	 natural	 systems,	 the	 particular	 problem	 that	
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concerns	geologists	(that	of	finding	a	fossil	record	of	the	geological	change	brought	about	by	human	beings)	is	rather	left	aside.		But	again:	the	political	Anthropocene	must	not	obstruct	the	scientific	Anthropocene.	The	search	for	stratigraphical	evidence	should	continue	whatever	is	said	in	the	social	sciences	-but	not	vice	versa!	We	will	elaborate	this	crucial	point	in	a	moment,	but	let	us	add	that	such	geological	quest	is	also	independent	from	other	scientific	insights.	Historically	speaking,	the	Anthropocene	does	not	begin	abruptly	 with	 an	 isolated	 event:	 unlike	 past	 geological	 epochs,	 it	 features	 a	 cumulative,	asynchronous	and	prolonged	start	(see	Lewin	and	Macklin	2014).	It	cannot	be	otherwise,	since	the	human	impact	on	the	planet	is	not	an	event	but	a	process.	What	geologists	do	is	looking	for	an	event	that	can	serve	as	a	estratigraphical	marker	-but	the	event	itself,	no	matter	its	symbolic	connotations,	is	relatively	unimportant	in	itself.	Difficult	as	it	may	be,	these	two	aspects	of	the	Anthropocene	should	not	be	conflated.	As	a	way	of	comparison,	Earth	System	Science	does	not	need	such	event:	it	registers	and	measures	 the	 alteration	 of	 planetary	 systems	 as	 the	 outcome	 of	 human	 activity,	 and	 it	 can	certainly	single	out	particular	technologies	or	practices	as	having	greater	impact	than	others,	but	it	does	not	need	any	"poster	boy	event"	for	saying	what	it	has	to	say	about	the	Anthropocene.	Then	again,	it	would	be	unfair	to	suggest	that	members	of	the	Anthropocene	Working	Group	have	been	actively	looking	for	such	publicity	stunt.		Now,	if	the	natural	and	the	social	sciences	were	separated	from	each	other,	these	confusions	would	not	 take	place.	 Yet	we	would	be	worst	 off	without	 them	 -they	 are	creative	 confusions.	After	 all,	neither	the	Anthropocene	nor	climate	change	are	just	scientific	observations,	but	also	knowledge-production	 processes	 through	which	 human	 societies	 learn	 to	 deal	with	 the	 complexity	 of	 their	ecological	entanglements.	For	Renn	and	Scherer,	the	logical	conclusion	is	that		"the	Anthropocene	shows	that	the	sciences	and	culture	do	not	belong	to	a	comfort	zone	wherefrom	the	world	can	be	observed	and	described.	Rather	they	are	part	of	the	processes	by	which	we	operate	in	it.	This	means	that	they	also	make	the	world	they	describe"	(Renn	and	Scherer	2017,	15).		Interestingly,	though,	the	very	scientific	enterprise	that	is	dennounced	as	one	of	the	main	culprits	of	environmental	 degradation	 and	 ontological	 alienation	 have	 been	 able	 to	 correct	 themselves	 by	gradually	introducing	the	epistemological	premise	that	the	ecological	is	also	social	and	thus	cannot	be	confined	in	the	natural	sciences	narrowly	understood.	And	vice	versa:	human	beings	and	societies	cannot	be	understood	 in	 isolation	anymore.	 Following	 the	pioneering	work	of	 anthropology,	 the	social	 sciences	 assumed	 this	 perspective	 -in	 sociology,	 economy,	 philosophy.	 Political	 theory	followed	suit,	as	well	as	the	humanities.	The	human	sciences,	in	sum,	have	successfully	incorporated	the	 environment	 and	 the	 nonhuman	world	 to	 their	 inquiries.	 Such	 ascertainment	 threatens	 the	"anthropic	 principle"	 that	 has	 been	 the	 foundation	 of	 human	 epistemology	 since	 -at	 least-	 the	Enlightenment	(see	Welsch	2012).	 In	 fact,	and	 for	all	 the	epistemological	arrogance	of	 the	social	sciences,	so	often	translated	into	a	feeling	of	superiority	over	their	unsophisticated	colleagues	in	the	natural	sciences,	the	weakening	of	the	anthropic	principled	has	been	mostly	led	by	the	latter:	from	Copernicus	 to	 Darwin.	 Furthermore,	 the	 methodological	 objection	 posed	 by	 sociologists	 and	philosophers	 of	 science	 -who	 contest	 the	 very	 possibility	 of	 producing	 an	 objective	 account	 of	reality-	can	be	interpreted	as	a	reinforcement	of	such	anthropic	principle:	not	even	when	looking	through	the	microscope	can	we	get	rid	of	the	long	human	shadow!		Actually,	 the	 Anthropocene	 and	 climate	 change	 constitute	 the	 most	 fruitful	 examples	 of	 a	 new	
cooperation	 through	dialogue	between	the	social	and	the	natural	sciences.	 In	both	cases,	we	 face	significant	changes	in	natural	systems	that	have	been	induced	by	social	activity,	changes	that	now	in	turn	condition	that	same	activity	-a	play	of	multiple	feedbacks	in	both	directions	linked	to	a	number	of	causation	chains.	Although	the	social	and	the	natural	can	still	be	distinguished,	it	makes	no	sense	to	study	them	separatedly.	Which	is	the	effect	of	urbanization	on	biodiversity?	And	the	impact	of	climate	change	on	human	migration?	Which	is	the	dividing	line	between	the	natural	and	the	social	as	far	as	the	decreasing	effectiveness	of	antibiotics	is	concerned?	No	matter	where	we	look	at,	society	
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is	within	nature	and	nature	is	within	society.	And	yet	grand	statements,	no	matter	how	accurate,	do	not	solve	 the	problem	by	 themselves	 -how	environmental	political	 theory	should	respond	to	 the	Anthropocene	science	remains	to	be	decide.		
4.	Getting	science	right.		How	are	then	environmental	political	theorists	to	deal	with	the	Anthropocene	science?	Hamilton's	position	is	a	good	starting	point,	as	he	demands	that	"whatever	conclusions	one	might	draw	as	to	the	ultimate	causes	and	the	solutions	to	the	Anthropocene,	an	understanding	of	the	basic	science	of	it	must	come	first"	(Hamilton	2017,	10).	Although	Hamilton	is	complaining	that	the	scientific	content	of	the	Anthropocene	is	being	misunderstood,	conflating	planetary	change	with	massive	ecosystem	disruption,	he	is	essentially	right.	What	interests	me	here	is	precisely	the	other	part	of	his	statement	-namely,	that	science	comes	first	and	the	debate	about	"causes	and	solutions"	follows.	This	means	two	things:	firstly,	that	scientific	facts	cannot	be	rejected;	secondly,	that	scientific	insights	should	inform	both	explanatory	accounts	and	political	solutions.	At	the	same	time,	different	scientific	claims	must	 be	 treated	 differently:	 an	 observation	 or	 a	measurement	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 an	 untested	hypothesis	or	a	modellization	of	how	the	future	-or	several	possible	futures-	might	look.		To	be	sure,	 the	second	part	of	his	warning	 is	also	relevant	 -yet	 for	reasons	other	 than	 intended.	Hamilton	insists	that	the	real	Anthropocene	science	is	Earth	System	Science,	which	in	his	writings	sound	 as	 a	 consolidated	 discipline	 instead	 of	 a	 still	 young	 body	 of	 knowledge	 awaiting	 due	recognition.	The	planetary	system	that	it	postulates	is	certainly	plausible,	as	the	effects	of	climate	change	suggest,	but	its	complexity	requires	a	demanding	process	of	scientific	validation	that	will	take	 its	 time:	 veryfing	 knowledge	 about	 a	 hyper-complex	 open	 system	 is	 not	 an	 easy	 task	 (see	Oldfield	and	Steffen	2014).	The	same	goes	for	the	geological	hypothesis,	which,	as	we	have	seen,	is	yet	to	take	the	form	of	an	official	request	to	be	formally	evaluated	by	the	International	Commission	on	Stratigraphy	-a	process	that	can	take	up	to	10	years.	Noel	Castree	(2018)	has	expressed	his	fear	that,	 if	 the	Anthropocene	science	does	not	 take	 its	 time	to	develop	and	to	be	scrutinized,	 it	may	become	 subject	 to	 the	 sort	 of	 politically-led	 skepticism	 that	 so	damaged	 the	public	 reception	of	climate	 science	 in	 the	 early	 2000s.	 If	 political	 theorists	 proceed	 cautiously	 and	 await	 greater	scientific	consensus,	he	suggests,	they	might	avoid	the	accusation	of	uncritical	reliance	on	scientific	expertise	-which	means	that	they	"scientize"	their	arguments	on	behalf	of	the	nonhuman	world	just	to	be	more	persuasive.		This	otherwise	advisable	strategy	suffers	 from	two	related	shortcomings.	First,	 it	 cannot	be	 fully	implemented,	as	the	collective	enthusiasm	for	the	new	term	shows;	second,	it	would	compel	political	theorists	to	give	up	on	a	notion	that	is	proving	fruitful	despite	not	having	been	fully	validated	yet.	Decisively,	the	way	in	which	the	Anthropocene	is	being	useful	for	scientists	in	both	the	natural	and	the	social	sciences	does	not	depend	on	the	validation	of	the	geological	hypothesis.	The	Anthropocene	works	 because	 it	 recognizes	 human	 transformational	 power	 and	 the	 impact	 it	 has	 have	 on	 the	natural	 environment.	Anthropogenic	 climate	 change	 suggest,	 in	 fact,	 that	 at	 least	 one	 important	planetary	 system	 as	 been	 affected	 -albeit	 indirectly-	 as	 a	 whole.	 Therefore,	 it	 has	 become	 a	framework	for	understanding	socionatural	relations	in	a	new	way,	directing	the	research	across	the	sciences	and	the	humanities.	Perhaps	this	could	have	waited	until	proper	validation	in	the	involved	branches	 -geology	 and	 Earth	 System-	 had	 taken	 place.	 But,	 then	 again,	 what	 does	 prevent	environmental	political	theorists	from	making	a	careful	usage	of	science	that	distinguishes	between	facts	and	norms,	measurements	and	hypothesis,	descriptions	and	prescriptions?		These	distinctions	are	of	the	utmost	importance	if	science	is	to	play,	as	it	must,	a	beneficial	role	in	environmental	political	theory.	Although	scientists	cannot	isolate	themselves	from	the	society	they	inhabit	and	thus	cannot	pretend	to	stand	beyond	good	and	evil,	the	scientific	method	guarantees	the	ability	to	produce	a	reasonably	objective	knowledge	about	the	reality	they	observe.	However	dated	this	claim	may	seen,	measuring	the	temperatures	or	making	sense	of	the	functioning	of	the	ocean	
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belt	 conveyor	 by	 observing	 and	describing	 it	 are	not	 "social	 constructions".	 They	 are,	 in	 a	way,	representations	-language	and	concepts	are	needed	to	produce	and	express	them.	But	they	are	not	figments	of	a	collective	imagination:	they	relate	to	an	objective	reality.	Or	it	doesn't?	This	is	an	old	philosophical	discussion,	that	usually	ends	when	someone	wave	about	a	poker	against	the	skeptics.	Science	is	about	facts	that	can	be	verified,	not	a	system	of	beliefs	that	can	be	embraced	or	rejected	at	will.	Those	facts	must	be	the	starting	point	for	the	political	conversation	about	the	Anthropocene.	But	whereas	established	 facts	are	univocal,	 their	social	meanings,	as	well	as	 "the	causes	and	the	solutions"	Hamilton	 talks	 about,	 are	nothing	but.	And	 that	 is	what	political	 theorists	 should	 talk	about:	meanings,	causes,	solutions.		However,	such	distinction	may	not	be	so	neat.	Bruno	Latour	has	recently	argued	that	description	is	always	accompanied	by	a	constraining	set	of	injunctions.	They	are,	in	short,	prescriptions	as	well.	Drawing	on	Nietzsche,	he	notes	that		"the	pure,	brute	existence	of	incontestable	facts	enter	abruptly	into	the	discussion	to	bring	it	to	an	end,	thus	fully	playing	the	normative	role	that	these	facts	were	not	supposed	to	have"	(Latour	2017,	23).		That	is	precisely	why,	Latour	elaborates,	climate	deniers	make	so	strenuous	efforts	in	discrediting	climatic	facts	-if	they	were	accepted,	their	"simple"	description	would	carry	normative	effects.	The	reason	 lies	 in	that	to	describe	"is	always	not	only	to	 inform	but	also	 to	alarm,	 to	move,	 to	set	 in	motion,	to	call	to	action"	(Latour	2017,	26).	Facts	prescribe	because	they	are	stubborn	-once	they	are	 "discovered"	 they	 cannot	 be	 removed	 nor	 should	 they	 be	 ignored.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 new	climatic	regime	has	created	an	unbereable	tension	between	description	and	prescription	and	has	made	every	constative	statement	a	performative	one.	The	same	can	be	said	of	the	Anthropocene,	understood	as	a	set	of	factual	claims	about	the	antropogenic	disruption	of	planetary	systems.	Yet	Latour	provides	a	key	nuance:		"What	doubtless	explains	in	part	the	old	idea	that	description	entails	no	prescription	is	that	these	warnings	obviously	do	not	spell	in	detail	what	has	to	be	done.	They	are	merely	ways	of	putting	collective	action	under	
tension"	(Latour	2017,	48-49).		This	 can	 also	 be	 formulated	 by	 saying	 that	 is	 entails	 ought,	 but	 leaves	 open	 the	 content	 of	 the	corresponding	 prescription.	 Something	 must	 be	 done,	 yet	 nothing	 in	 particular	 should	 be	 done.	Again,	that	is	partly	what	the	political	conversation	is	about:	finding	out	what	is	exactly	to	be	done.	Following	this	logic,	the	distinction	between	description	and	prescription	can	be	preserved,	albeit	not	in	a	pure	form:	descriptions	prescribe,	but	make	no	explicit	indications.	In	turn,	this	allows	to	maintain	the	separation	between	the	scientific	and	the	political	Anthropocene,	even	though	the	latter	will	 forcefully	 refer	 to	 the	 former	 and	 sometimes	 scientists	 will	 be	 tempted	 to	 make	 political	recommendations.	That	said,	these	are	two	different	set	of	claims,	political	and	scientific,	no	matter	who	-the	scientist	or	the	political	theorists-	is	making	them.		Usually,	 the	 science	 is	 invoked	 in	 order	 to	 legitimize	 the	 politics.	 But	 let	 us	 keep	 in	 mind	 the	ambivalences	at	play.	On	the	one	hand,	the	political	discussion	takes	place	because	there	is	not	just	one	political	path	towards	sustainability	 -or,	 to	put	 it	more	widely,	 there	 is	not	 just	one	political	response	to	the	facts	communicated	by	scientists.	At	the	same	time,	though,	normative	statements	on	the	part	of	political	theorists	cannot	ignore	scientific	claims:	they	are	compelled	to	incorporate	the	 scientific	 viewpoint	 lest	 they	 present	 groundless	 or	 delusional	 arguments.	 Scientific	observations	and	measurements	are	not	dependent	on	social	contexts	or	cultural	biases	-although	
what	 is	 to	 be	 observed	 and	 measured	 certainly	 can.	 Science	 will	 thus	 provide	 a	 view	 of	 the	socionatural	 relation	 as	 it	 stands,	 as	well	 as	 a	 number	 of	 certainties	 about	natural	 systems,	 the	degree	 of	 human	 presence	 in	 them,	 etc.	 Unavoidably,	 there	will	 be	misunderstandings	 between	scientists	and	political	theorists,	but	the	benefits	provided	by	their	mutual	engagement	far	exceed	its	shortcomings.	How	possibly	could	complexity	be	approached	in	a	simple	manner?		
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As	 for	 scientists,	 they	 should	 refrain	 from	 making	 normative	 claims	 about	 how	 to	 organize	socionatural	 relations	or	 to	pursue	 sustainability	 -that	 is	not	 their	 function	 in	 the	public	debate.	Nevertheless,	this	restriction	is	probably	too	harsh	and,	above	all,	unrealistc.	Natural	scientists	feel	concerned	about	the	preservation	of	the	nonhuman	world	and	wish	to	speak	out	in	its	favour.	Often,	too,	they	are	asked	about	the	solutions	they	would	choose.	And,	of	course,	they	must	be	consulted	on	the	technical	viability	of	political	proposals.	What	can	be	asked	for,	in	this	context,	is	that	they	make	their	 political	 or	 normative	 statements	 explicit	 and	 clearly	 separated	 from	 their	 scientific	investigations.		
5.	Getting	politics	right.		Different	kind	of	statements	about	socionatural	relations	in	the	Anthropocene	can	be	discerned.	On	the	 one	 hand,	 there	 are	 factual	 statements	 which	 derive	 from	 observations,	 measurements,	comparisons	and	the	like.	Then	there	are	scientific	theories	about	the	functioning	of	natural	systems	and	 their	 interaction	 with	 social	 systems	 -in	 turn,	 they	 can	 be	 untested	 hypothesis	 that	 await	verification	 or	 become	 falsified	 theories	 already	 accepted	 by	 the	 scientific	 community.	 If	 the	disciplinary	boundary	is	crossed,	there	are	explanations	about	the	state	of	socionatural	relations,	past	and	present,	that	can	make	use	of	scientific	insights	(for	instance,	appealing	to	evolutionary	theory).	 Then	 there	 is	 the	 debate	 about	 the	meanings	 of	 scientific	 concepts	 and	 scientifically	described	socionatural	events.	And,	finally,	although	the	list	is	not	exhaustive,	there	are	normative	
claims	about	that	what	should	be	done	about	human-nature	relations.	Needless	to	say,	the	degree	of	certainty	of	these	statements	differ	widely:	the	more	factual,	the	less	uncertain,	and	vice	versa.		To	make	 sense	 of	 this	 taxonomy,	 and	 suggesting	 a	 way	 of	 organising	 the	 relationship	 between	Anthropocene	science	and	environmental	political	 theory,	Hannah	Arendt's	view	of	 truth	can	be	useful.	 In	Truth	 and	 Politics,	 Arendt	 (2006)	 implicitly	 refutes	Nietzsche's	 famous	dictum	 against	positivism,	according	to	which	"there	are	no	facts,	only	interpretations"	(see	Kaufmann	1994,	458).	Nietzsche	himself	was	refuting	an	equally	radical	claim,	namely,	that	there	are	only	facts.	Actually,	there	 are	 facts	and	 interpretations,	 the	 value	 of	 Arendt's	 account	 being	 the	 recognition	 of	 such	circumstance.	She	is	not	talking	exactly	about	scientific	statements,	rather	of	the	opposition	between	
factual	 truth	 and	 political	 truth.	 And	 she	 does	 so	 concerned	 by	 the	 mass	 politics	 that	 led	 to	totalitarian	regimes	in	Europe,	regimes	which	made	efforts	to	manipulate	history	and	hide	the	most	unbecoming	 aspects	 of	 their	 socioeconomic	 reality.	 Still,	 her	 account	 can	 be	 recruited	 for	ascertaining	the	role	of	Anthropocene	science	within	environmental	political	theory,	for	reasons	that	will	be	evident	below.		Arendt	observes	that	a	common	strategy	to	discredit	factual	truths	is	to	treat	them	as	opinions,	i.e.	to	render	them	a	matter	of	belief	or	choice.	The	ensuing	problem	is	that	of	factual	reality	itself,	which	in	 her	 view	 is	 "a	 political	 problem	 of	 the	 first	 order"	 	 (Arendt	 2006,	 232).	 Facts	 feature	 an	"unyielding,	blatant,	unpersuasive	stubbornness"	(2006,	233);	a	way	of	depicting	them	close	to	that	of	Latour.	Therefore,	facts	are	not	opinions,	despite	facts	informing	opinions.	Opinions,	on	their	part,	can	vary	and	they	will	be	legitimate	as	long	as	they	respect	factual	truth.	Hence:		"Freedom	of	opinion	is	a	farce	unless	factual	information	is	guaranteed	and	the	facts	themselves	are	not	in	dispute"	(Arendt	2006,	234).		This	is	also	the	case	of	the	Anthropocene	science	and	the	factual	truths	that	it	carries,	which	must	be	the	 foundation	 of	 the	 political	 discussion	 about	 their	 meanings,	 consequences,	 and	 normative	implications.	Such	facts	cannot	be	just	denied	or	rejected	as	a	"narrative",	a	representation	made	up	of	social	assumptions	and	dominant	values:	 facts	are	 facts.	That	 is	why,	Arendt	also	notes,	 truth	"carries	with	itself	an	element	of	coercion"	insofar	as		"once	perceived	as	 true	and	pronounced	 to	be	so,	 they	have	 in	common	 that	 they	are	beyond	agreement,	dispute,	opinion,	or	consent"	(Arendt	2006,	234).	
Manuel	Arias-Maldonado	
 10 
	Such	character	does	fit	well	into	the	political	realm,	which	is	organized	arount	debate:	facts	claims	to	be	acknowledged	and	preclude	debate	 itself,	 thus	possessing	"a	despotic	character".	They	are	beyond	 agreement	 and	 consent	 and	 talking	 about	 them	 "will	 contribute	 nothing	 to	 their	establishment"	(2006,	236).	Surely,	they	can	be	rejected,	as	climate	change	comes	to	show.	But	the	fact	itself,	the	reality	they	embody,	does	not	disappear	as	a	result	-that	is,	again,	its	stubbornness.		Yet	 an	 interesting	 difference	 between	 factual	 truths	 of	 the	 kind	 Arendt	 is	 discussing	 and	 those	communicated	by	science	concerns	their	contingency.	She	suggests	that	facts	"have	no	conclusive	reason	whatever	for	being	what	they	are"	in	the	sense	that	"they	could	always	have	been	otherwise,	and	this	annoying	contingency	is	literally	unlimited"	(2006,	238).	The	contrast	is	interesting	because	natural	laws	cannot	be	otherwise	and	that	amounts	to	a	particularly	strong	stubbornness.	What	could	have	been	different,	however,	is	the	way	in	which	socionatural	relations	unfolded	-different	because	human	 beings	 and	 societies	 introduce	 an	 element	 of	 contingency	 that	 can	 and	 should	 be	incorporated	into	the	discussion.	Even	though,	as	I	think,	human	aggressive	adaptation	to	nature	is	not	exactly	a	contingency	-but	again,	that	is	something	to	discuss,	not	a	"fact"	in	the	manner	of	an	increase	in	global	average	temperatures	in	a	given	year.	It	follows	therefrom	that	scientific	facts	are	even	more	compelling	than	historical	ones,	insofar	as	they	are	less	contingent	or,	in	any	event,	they	respond	to	natural	laws	that	can	certainly	be	used	advantageously	but	not	changed	nor	ignored.		The	relationship	between	Anthropocene	science	and	political	theory	is	thus	directly	affected	by	the	conclusion	 to	which	 Arendt,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 her	 essay,	 arrives.	 Namely,	 that	 the	 whole	 sphere	 of	political	life	is	limited:		"It	is	limited	by	those	things	which	men	cannot	change	at	will.	And	it	is	only	by	respecting	its	own	borders	that	this	realm,	where	we	are	free	to	act	and	to	change,	can	remain	intact,	preserving	its	integrity	and	keeping	its	promises"	(Arendt	2006,	259).		Truth,	 she	 concludes,	 is	 that	 what	 we	 cannot	 change,	 and	 her	 words	 amply	 resonate	 in	 our	conversation.	The	political	concerns	that	what	human	beings	can	change	at	will	-although	we	could	add	 those	 who	 have	 been	 changed	 unintentionally,	 as	 climate	 change	 and	 other	 aspects	 of	 the	Anthropocene	 can	 arguably	 be	 described.	 This	 is	 important,	most	 of	 all,	 to	 prevent	 two	 kind	 of	attitudes	that	stand	at	opposite	sides	in	the	socionatural	debate:	the	one	that	denies	scientific	facts	or	 treat	 them	as	opinions	(as	with	climate	deniers)	and	 that	which	expresses	itself	 in	unrealistic	assumptions	 about	 sustainability	 (be	 them	 cornucopian	 or	 promoters	 of	 de-growth	 strategies).	However,	these	distinctions	are	harder	to	keep	as	we	depart	from	scientific	facts	and	start	discusing	what	is	and	what	is	not	feasible	regarding	socionatural	relations.	What	can	we	actually	change	at	
will?	What	socionatural	configurations	can	be	pursued	and	which	ones	are,	contrariwise,	unfeasible	and	perhaps	dangerous?		To	answer	such	questions,	we	need	a	political	conversation	in	which	two	dangers	are	paramount.	Firstly,	 science	 can	 be	 ignored	 and	 socionatural	 relations	 treated	 as	 endlessly	 plastic;	 secondly,	science	can	be	used	in	order	to	de-legitimize	plausible	alternatives.	How	to	avoide	them?	We	can	ask	those	who	engage	in	the	conversation	not	to	do	either	of	this,	but	it	would	be	naive	to	think	they	will	do	as	told.	Therefore,	it	must	be	accepted	that	the	very	definition	of	the	boundaries	of	the	political	vis-à-vis	the	scientific	will	be	part	of	the	discussion.	In	other	words:	the	possible	and	the	impossible	are	to	be	politically	discerned,	but	those	who	advance	arguments	in	this	context	cannot	ignore	the	science,	which	will	then	work	as	a	limit	to	the	political.	The	obligation	to	respect	firmly	established	scientific	facts	becomes,	then,	a	guiding	principle	in	such	deliberation	-a	rule	to	be	applied	when	the	validity	of	different	claims	is	weighed.	As	noted	earlier,	not	all	scientific	statements	are	the	same	-they	vary	in	type	and	degree	of	certainty.		When	facing	the	Anthropocene,	then,	environmental	political	theorists	cannot	ignore	the	science	nor	ignore	the	fact	that	the	science	is	not	yet	firm,	as	both	the	geological	case	and	the	Earth	System	one	
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are	 not	 sufficiently	 established.	 This	 uncertainty	 should	 be	 registered	 by	 political	 theorists,	especially	 since	 it	 does	 not	 prevent	 them	 from	 taking	 the	 science	 that	 is	 certain,	 i.e.	 the	overwhelming	amount	of	data	about	human	influence	on	natural	systems	and	the	planet	at	large.	Science,	as	it	stands,	must	be	integrated	into	political	theorization	and	accepted	as	a	departing	point	for	critical	discussion.	Yet	political	theorists	have	the	right,	or	maybe	the	duty,	to	check	the	kind	of	claims	that	scientist	make.	Not	in	order	to	discuss	their	results	or	question	the	methodology,	but	to	make	sure	that	they	do	not	reach	harried	conclusions	of	any	kind	when	none	is	warranted.		At	 the	 same	 time,	 political	 theorists	 are	 among	 those	 who	 -together	 with	 philosophers-	 try	 to	elucidate	which	is	the	moral	and	political	meaning	of	scientific	statements,	i.e.	established	scientific	facts	 about	 the	 current	 state	 and	 past	 trajectory	 of	 socionatural	 relations.	What	 news	 does	 the	Anthropocene	 bring?	 Are	 human	 beings	 now	 in	 command	 of	 the	 planet,	 or	 the	 irruption	 of	 the	geological	diminishes	their	role?	Is	naming	a	geological	epoch	after	us	an	exercise	in	realism	or	an	act	of	megalomania?	Who	is	exactly	the	anthropos	that	the	term	conjures?	What	about	the	language	we	use	or	the	images	we	choose	in	talking	about	the	Anthropocene?	What	do	they	convey	and	what	do	 they	 exclude?	 If	 we	 talk	 about	 transformation	 and	 hybridicization,	 aren't	 we	 hiding	 the	destructive	side	of	human	agency?	But	again,	is	it	the	talk	of	a	Sixth	Extinction	justified,	or	scientists	are	not	exactly	saying	that	we	are	already	going	through	it?		Politics,	then,	 is	also	about	science.	But	not	about	accepting	or	rejecting	what	science	has	 to	say,	rather	about	what	is	the	meaning,	the	relevance,	and	the	implications	of	that	which	science	tells	us.	This	is	not	exactly	to	politicize	science,	but	to	engage	politically	with	it.	A	good	example	of	the	virtues	(and	perils)	of	this	approach	is,	as	noted	above,	the	debate	about	the	beginning	of	the	Anthropocene	-political	 theorists	have	been	somewhat	unscrupulous	when	discussing	this	matter,	as	 they	have	often	 thought	only	 in	 symbolic	 and	political	 terms	 leaving	aside	 the	 geological	 requirements	 for	setting	a	proper	date.	But	maybe	geologists	themselves	have	misled	them!	Another,	perhaps	better	example	 of	 this	 method	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 alternatives	 to	 the	 term	 "Anthropocene":	 from	Capitalocene	 (see	 Moore	 2014)	 to	 Technocene	 (see	 Sloterdijk	 2017)	 and	 even	 Chthulucene	(Haraway	2016).	Without	giving	it	a	name,	ecofeminist	thinkers	have	also	presented	an	alternative	understanding	of	the	Anthropocene	as	a	typically	male-driven	historical	process	(see	Grusin	2017).	It	 is	 a	 creative	 way	 of	 advancing	 different	 interpretations	 of	 the	 Anthropocene	 hypothesis:	 not	questioning	what	can	be	measured	but	reinterpreting	why	we	have	reached	this	point	-as	something	that	must	be	found	out	before	we	can	decide	how	 to	deal	with	it.	Yet	the	latter	is	a	question	that	cannot	be	answered	as	if	factual	constraints	would	not	exist.		The	intended	picture	is	that	of	politics	as	an	activity	limited	by	"that	what	we	cannot	change",	namely	factual	truths,	but	not	suppressed	by	them:	Arendt,	I	hope,	would	have	approved.		
6.	Conclusion.		Throughout	 this	paper,	 I	have	explored	 the	uneasy	relationship	between	environmental	political	theory	and	environmentally-related	science,	more	particularly	the	emerging	Anthropocene	science.	By	 the	 latter	 I	mean	both	the	geological	hypothesis	 that	a	new	epoch	 in	 the	Earth	cronology	has	started	and	the	Earth	System	science	claim	that	planetary	systems,	understood	as	an	interconnected	totality	that	regulate	the	Earth,	have	been	anthropogenically	disrupted.	Several	critiques	have	been	made	by	environmental	political	theorists,	most	of	them	a	variation	of	old	arguments	about	the	role	of	science	in	the	domination	of	nature:	science	is	everything	but	neutral,	 its	frames	and	concepts	determine	the	way	in	which	we	see	the	natural	world,	the	supposedly	"objective"	scientific	method	is	plagued	by	 social	assumptions,	 descriptions	of	 the	Anthropocene	 are	 filled	with	prescriptions	about	how	to	respond	to	it,	the	science	itself	is	not	well	established	yet.	Some	scientists	even	suggest	that	the	Anthropocene	is	more	pop	culture	than	geology,	while	there	is	also	the	view	that	it	is	not	geology	but	Earth	System	science	what	must	count	as	"the	science	of	the	Anthropocene".		
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Be	that	as	it	may,	I	have	tried	to	show	that	a	reasonably	clear-cut	distinction	between	science	and	politics	can	be	maintained,	despite	the	partial	validity	of	the	abovementioned	reservations.	English	writer	J.	G.	Ballard	(2014,	456)	wrote	that	"science	continually	dismantles	the	world	and	feels	utterly	free	of	 any	 emotional	 entanglements	 that	 cloud	 reality".	And	 this	 is	 true,	 for	 good	and	worse:	 it	allows	 us	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 material	 and	 nonhuman	 worlds	 -as	 well	 as	 the	 human	interactions	with	them-	and	at	 the	same	time	it	creates	a	"way	of	seeing"	 them	that	so	often	has	contributed	to	their	exploitation	or	mistreatment.	However,	science	has	also	corrected	himself	and	changed	dramatically	the	framing	through	which	we	approach	the	(natural)	world.	Admittedly,	 it	has	done	so	with	the	help	of	the	human	sciences,	and	as	a	result	the	distinction	between	the	so-called	"two	cultures"	is	now	weakened.	In	view	of	this	interdisciplinary	promiscuity,	to	demand	"objective	purity"	 from	 science	 is	 not	 fitting.	 Yet	 science	 can	 provide	 it.	 That	 is,	 it	 can	 provide	 enough	"objective"	statements	about	reality	for	a	distinction	between	scientific	and	political	claims	to	make	sense.	Naturally,	not	all	scientific	claims	are	the	same,	nor	can	all	be	affirmed	with	equal	certainty:	a	measurement	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 an	 hypothesis,	 feedback	mechanisms	as	 they	 can	 be	 presently	observed	differ	from	an	estimation	of	their	future	occurrence.		In	 this	 context,	 environmental	 political	 theory	 cannot	 ignore	 science	 nor	 treat	 it	 as	 a	 mere	"narrative",	i.e.	some	sort	of	fiction	inspired	by	the	social	contamination	of	the	laboratory.	Science	works	-again,	for	good	and	worse.	This	means	that	political	theorists	should	treat	science	as	Arendt	treats	factual	truths:	as	something	that	cannot	be	changed	and	must	be	incorporated	as	such	in	the	political	realm,	which	actually	is	 limited	by	them.	It	would	be	shocking	that,	while	environmental	political	 theory	 has	 always	 attempted	 to	 turn	natural	 limits	 into	 a	political	 factor,	 it	 is	 to	 reject	scientific	statements	just	because	they	are	not	the	"right"	ones.	What	political	theorists	should	do	is	to	discuss	the	moral	and	political	meaning	of	the	news	that	science	conveys,	as	well	as	its	normative	implications.	Needless	to	say,	such	division	of	work	is	not	without	its	grey	zones:	there	are	scientific	hypothesis	 not	 yet	 tested	 that,	 however,	 produce	 effects	 in	 the	 public	 imagination;	 there	 are	scientists	making	normative	claims;	and,	crucially,	there	are	natural	limits	that	can	be	tweaked	and	expanded	 by	 human	 ingenuity.	 This	 last	 point	 shows	 how	 much	 easier	 it	 is	 to	 explain	 past	socionatural	relations	 than	 it	 is	 to	predict	 their	 future	or	 to	design	 them.	That	 is	 just	one	reason	among	many	why	environmental	political	science	must	be	scientifically	 informed	-lest	 its	claims	become	a	flatus	vocis	disentangled	from	socionatural	reality	and	its	stubborn	(im)possibilities.		
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